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IWrHODUC'riON  - s~A 
It is not  easy um1e:r  the prcnent  circwn::r~anccs to ·talk  <Ybout  ''Pro::~pectn for 
monetary intcgratior1 :Ln  t:he  European  Community". 
that Europe is in a  sorry  state at preHent. 
Public opinion is agreed 
':Po day  the European  Community  stands at  a  crossroada.  The  events  of the 
last feu months  and the behaviour of the  Governments  of  the  I.1embcr  St<d;es 
have-disappointed many  hopes.  In rctrcx;poct  7  one  'donder-r;  '.·:h<"'!tl:cr  <:ell  those 
who  made  solemn declarationr5  a1Jout  economic  and poli-tical union  1·mre 
prepared to  drm·l  all the  consequences  tJwrefrom.  Indeed,  i·l;  Gccms  doubtful 
·that the Governments  of -the  member  countries have  the Hill  a;ncl  the  eovrnge 
to progress further  on  t.he  road to\varch;  } 1~ru·opcan unity and.  :i.n  particular 
tovw.rds  monetary union. 
In my  opinion,  there  can be  no  doubt  rthotlt  the ultimate  a.:i.m  of  achicvin{~ 
monetary union  and  itG necessity,  al  t;1ou.gh  the  appropriatene~;B of  the 
methode  ancl  teclmiquer:;  UGed  up  to  noH,  can llo  questioned. 
Tod<1~/  l!:uropean 
unity in the monetary field is importe.nl;  and urgent as  nev~r before•,  but if 
we  arE:  to  succeed,  He  must  reconsider  tho  formular;  and prococi.ul·c:-;  and 
adjuf.Jt  them  to  the  chn.ngecl  situation. 
In my  address  tod0.y  I  vwuld  like to  o11tlinc  some  i clov.G  ancl  Jll'OJlC'f'<!.lu  before 
this dif.;tinguished.  audience  of cxpertr;.  Perhaps  in tJJe  p2.r:t  w,:  ha.ve  too 
often evolved theories  on  the  clrav1ing  l•C><•.rd.  Perhaps  \:e  have  h:vl  too  feu 
discuusions  >•'i th lltu1.kers  r:tncl  those  conco:rned viith  practical  affn.i:rs. 
But  we  must  ask  ourseJ.veH  fir:3-t  of aLL:  i·JCre  tho  rnoa  .. nr-;  B.lld  objecti  v~1s  of 
m~neta.ry int0grn.tion :i.n  the  European  Co;nP<unity  ur·onG? 
causef:J  of the  sot1Jackr:;  and  failures? of the situation munt.  lJeg~.n  ))j'  exc:unining tho 
Nhich  the  Melllher  States fixed at tho l1eginn:i.ng of  1971,  and 
have  contilma1ly reaffirmed• 
the  Com;nunity  :i.G  to pror;reGs  ·by  ctages  tovm:rdE;  E~~onom.LJ  and 
Union,  ancl  this should be  COHlpleted 'befol'l3  the  end of  1980. 
Secondly:  progress in the fields of econo1aic  and 1110notar,y  policy must 
proceed in a  parallel manner. 
Thirdly:  the  Cornmun:i.ty' s  organs  must  ncquire  tho  dccision-mald.ng authority 
requisite to the administration of  a..YJ  T!}~onomic and  M:metar;y  Union. 
2.2  The  final  o1Jjectivo  of  :I!Ponomic  and.  Ivi::metar.r  Union  11as  firmly  and 
clearly defined in the  Council Decision of 21  March  19'71. 
'l'he  aim is to establish  r1.11  intesTatecl  economy  a'llon~ all member  c.:ountries  in 
Hhich  there is free  rooveu:c-mt  of good:1 1  cerv"ices,  capital  aml  percons  1  and  in 
'Vlhich  they are  subject  to the  same  reguJ.u:tions.  ~.
10 achieve tld  B  aim  1  an 
independent  ::.onet~r,y  ar~."~ in vThich  there is a  common  central bc:mki:ng  syst0111 
must  emerge  Hithin the  frameNork.  of the international monetar;y  system. 
The  purpose  of monetary  cooperation is to  eliminate parity  cllail;?,OB  and  to 
narrov1 the uidth of the ba.ndo  'rli thin HhJ.ch  the value of Communitjr  currenc:i.eG 
can fluctuate.  In this Hay,  the conditions for the  introduction of  a 
common  1uropean currency  Hould be fulfilled. 
3.1  IJ.'he  final  ob~jectivc of  wonc~ta:r.,y  :Lntcc;ration is n.m'ir:pu.tc<l,  alld.,  Inorcovm~, 
in spite of all the difficultier:>  some  p:r.·ogTess  tmmrds  this  r;oo.l  has been 
achieved. 
In 1972  tho  I.~ornbe:c  State:;  aercod on "l.he  creation of a  l:;uJ.'ope:rm  1none ln.ry 
system,  the  so-cn.J led  11 SJJCJ"kc  in the  tm;XH!l
11 
1  v1hich  made  an  :i.mportnnt 
oontri  but  ion to  E~11.ropean monetary  stahU.i  t;y.  In this v;r\y·,  the  f:i.rst  steprJ 
,. Here  t-iken toviEu~da the  c::ccn:hon of an independent  J!:U.ropc<:\n.  rno:ne'I;Ary 
p0rsonality.  'llfl:i.s  s·trabr;e  animal,  the 
11:E.'uropean  shaken, functioned by 
mean~ of a  netvrork of ag:recrnents  1  rnultilatcr•al interventions in 
Conununity  currencies  and  rl.ollars,  shor"t-··term  credits and  l'Uler:l  for  tho 
periodic  se·~tling of rlebliu  betvmen  central banks. 
In l'lia.rch  1973  the  1111'm:•opcr.m  snake"  Has  able to function  an  m1  eff'cctivo 
implement  of defence  against  the  influx. of dollarn  and  ag::d.llErt  infhrtion  1 
as  Community  currencies floated againot  outside  currencion.  Vhthin  ·t;hc 
Gomrmmi ty this syr:;tem  assured relati  ve:Ly  stable exchange  rn.tes,  as 
fluctuations in the  spot  :rate  of Community  currencies uas  not  allouocl.  to 
exceed 2.  25~~.  In addition,  in the  context  of this European  rnonetnr;{ 
''bloc"  some  eo..rly  succesr.{es  in harmoniz.ing national money  and  crcc1:i. t 
policies,  and particularly interest-rate policy,  uere  achi. e'Jcd. 
3.  2  Ho1·1ever 1  no  progresr:;  t·ms  made  toua.rcls li  beraJ.izing capital movements 
or ha:rmonizing tho  capital marl::et  polic,y of the nember  :Ho.l;es.  On  the 
contrary  1  cluring the firPt  stage,  controls  on  cap:i tal rnoVC'lnent  ui  thin  the 
Community  t·rcre  incrca:oed.  It tvas  onl;y  recently in the aftermath  of the 
oil crisis that  scme  countries have  mov<~<l to  loos•,m  controls on i;he 
importation of capital. 
3.3  Finally  1  prenent plans for the  a.ch:i.evemcnt  of J!lconomic  nncl  r:r onetar;y 
Union envisage  consultation ancl  enclec;tvours  to  coordinate  <'-!3  the  most 
important  means  of harmonizing economic  and rnonet<•.ry  pol:i..c,y  in tl10  Jrember 
States. 
But  reality has  proven  to be quito different. 
Connul  tationB Vlhich  wore  to  be  oblign:tor;}T,  auovc  all in  coJ!lJ0.cticn  \i:i.th 
adjustments  in exchange  :r·r.ttes,  seltlom  took. place  l!.£I£E.~~.  the-;  nd~tc.l  clccision 
Has  made.  In ma1Jy  CP,fJCr:~,  the other pewtncrs  could only  trd~n noto  of  1:hat 
a  I~ombcr Government  h.:·,,d  oJreacly decided. ..  ···~. 
-~ .  .  _  .  ."- ·- a  monettU'y  al'Oa  OOI!IpOsecl  of the nine  ncmher  StatGfJ' 
.  .  -
.  H:i:th Hor\·fey  and  _S\:zodm1.,  and pOBEJibly  incluclilJ{-';  .i\l)f;l;;~'in  nm1 
SJvi·tzerland; '1vmUcl haveutcruTiithat  70  to  75~S .of tlle  foro:i.u1  t:rRlle  of 
countrfes:  v~ould have takon place at  ro1<.vti voly  ::rt.able  exdw.nc;e  rc'L-tes • 
T'nis -European monotary  a.roe.  has not  oo1ne  into  bein(~· 
theGe 
TodD.;)'  'V/0  are faced  t·Ti th  the fact  that  :Lnstoc.td  of moving tmm-r·dn  thiB 
monetary groupine;1  the present monete  .. r;y  situation is clwr;v.;-l.ieri:-:ed  by  a 
tendency  ·to  dininteg"l'a..te  into national uni  to.  'focl czy  o:nl;;  ftve  I1elllbcn' 
States - Belgium  1  the Netiwrlands  1  Lus:embourg1  Dt:nrr.ark  aml the  J~'ederal 
Repul)Hc  - and  t\';o  non-Ef!C  countries,  l'lor-.·Tey  and Svieden,  c:re  ntill 
participating in the EC  bloc floating. 
4• 2  'l'he  intensifi~ation of monetary i1r&egration as part  of tho Eco:nomic 
and Monetary Union Has  pl2..rmcd  for  19'(  t1"  Hith the  t1.'ansit:i.on to the 
E.2..£.<?J1d  stn  .. ~  the tasks  and  resources  of  the  BJ.ropr.~c:m Fu.nrJ_  for  Hon~Jtr-~ry 
Cooperation,  fomHlcd  in 197 31  v1ere  to  ·he  increm;ccl. 
term  crcdi  ts \•:as  to be transfonJed an<l  expanded  nnd  th<:'  firFt.  r.;teps 
tot-mrds  the pooling of  Community  monet;:tr.f  To serves taken. 
In addition to this  7  real prog-!'ess  HD.s  to have  be(m  made  in coo:rdinai.ing 
external monetary policy and  c1.ome~;tic 1ao:ney  and  ere  eli t  pol:i. des  7  D.G  Holl 
as in other fieldn  of economic policy.  It uas  roalizefl thet  c:,:clwJl{';c 
rate  adjustments  could not  be  excluded  in the tr·ansitiollal  pt_!:t'iod,  1mt 
they uere to  occur only ofter consul  tat:lons  among  the parhoipnJJ'Ls. 
Finally  1  the  Community  wn.s  to act  as  a  unit in i "tf>  -relattorw  iii-th  the 
outside Horld  and  to  he  represented b<v- a  sim:·:le  npe:1ke:~.·  in inter11nt:i.onal 
nogotiu.tiona  and bodies. 
4.3  In negotiat5.ng the proposals for the  ll2~£S?.J:lcl_2,;1<:!:::.£  of  i~conom:i.c  ond 
l'llonet<.U'Y  Union it became  clear that  ce:11pulsory  ceE3U.ltaLion  D.i1d 
coordinatio:n procedures lw.d  no  chance  of being urccptcd.  'i'IJ 0  ma,j ori  t;y 
of "tho  Governmcn-tH  re:fuzwl to limit tho  scope  of  na~j_olE.tl  (led. <;ion-rauk:i.ng. ur::1o ,.  the formu1  tram;:i.:tion  'lio  the,  fJ(,eond  ct>i~;e 
and Monetary U:nlon  has not -y1::'f been n.pppovod.  f3t1lmtunld. ve 
clecisionfJ  1  paving the,  Hay  for· the  sec(n1d  sta,:;c  1  l·;eJ·e  TJ':vcrtheJ.0r::~;  a;)provetl 
by the Gmmoil  of i':·Unisters onl8 J.i'ebr•ua.ry  of th:i.s  yr:::<xr. 
- - - - - -
If all ·the  CommiHG:i.on's  p1~oposals 1  including;that  on  t!Jc  f.Jonett!,r;t  Ji'nnd, 
had been approvecl by  the  end of la.st~rear,  this twuld ccJ.•la:i.nl;y  k·.vc  mo.o.e 
a  useful-contribv.tion  to<~arcls p:coc;ress in monetary intc.''l·a.tiim.  -- 'l
1od;zy 
there are. doubts Hhcther the  l·Ier~ber Stu.tes  are really propm.'ed -to harmonize 
their inatrumcntH  of economic policy  and  ensure that t!1nre  iB  a  o·ca.tci' 
degree  of  convcl"'e~onoe of economic  poli.cj_es  ii1 tho  Co1:Jnmn:i.ty.  rl'ho  Cou.nc:Ll 
again postponed its dccic:i.on  on the propo:-mlsYfo:r  Ccmumnit:y  poo}.:i_n,::  of 
currency r.oserves:  it l:i.nti ted itself to requcsti:ng a  repor·[;  from  thrl 
Comrni ttee of Central  Bani:  Governors  and the il].onetm·y  Comrai ttee bofol'O  ·!;he 
oncl  of Iiiarch · of.,this year on which it intends to take  action before the 
ertcl  of June  197 4· 
4.4  'l'he Qil erisir;  and.  :'1."1  s  financial  <-'-nd  economic  ropc:rcur>BiorLc  on the· 
coonomiec  of the  J·Iembor  ~itatcs have  oneo  a{;ain  pu·~  tho  Cc•lm•Junit;y  to the 
test.  Up  to now it has  not  mot  thin  challenge.  Diffe:nmt  d.ec:ror~s  of 
depcnclenoy and repero"J.Sqions  on price8 1  as 1·:oll  as  vu_r.;;:!.ng  bc~lance  of' 
pa;yments  and  emplo;yr,JC'Jt  situation::>,  ba.ve  further  Btrenr:;thcnccl  tho  ton<lenc;v 
of the Member  States -to  follou a  polic;y  of 
11evcr;y  man  for llimself
11  and 
"sauvc qui pout". 
As  a  result of tho  increrwe in the price of oil the 'bal<lYWO  of pa;vmon Gr.,;  of 
· EEC  countries as  o,  1·:holo  in 19'/  1~  uill  rle tcriorato  b:t  ur:qn·<.n;j  ;n~'.i.!;ly  Li :l:'tc!Oil 
to  h-wnty l)illion dollar:;. 
deal  h'ith 'thin situatJon in different  m,,'!s:  Gomc!  have  tr:i erJ  to  l'n.i ,-,e 
billions on tho  intr:::rn.:r~:i.onaJ.  capi-tal  wtdw-t,  to  incrcr;•o  tlwi.r  m:~·p 
a{,Tecmonts  Hith the U!'l  roGcrvo  sys-to;n,  -~.o  moJ::e  ur:e  of  JJ:P  crc.rl:i.tn 1  or to 
let their exchange  rates float  dovmwardc.  O'tiherc;  have  li  bcrnli  ~~ed 
capital import  oontroJ.G  aJ}d  pointed to their comfortable:  c·.JrJhion  o:f.'  l<,.rge 
f'orei{)'l  exchru1GC  :rosm·vo~.  Instead of ltorking c_.nt  joint  nt:ra.tegies  to 
overcome  the crisis,  evor,yonc is looldnr-~ for nation;:t,l  ;yJvnnto,ge.  Im~ tend 
of acting togetheT,  ovor,yone  is betting on na.tiow;l  ooc>JJomi c  ancl  mom~ta.ry 
policieo. gloomy  one. 
excluded. 
mbro  important  to  n.sk  the qneBtio)J:  Bas  ·tho  road 
- - -. 
to~·lm'cls Eqonomi c  aml  r.1onc tn.ry  Union l)ot;Lm  in 1971  be  como  impaGsciblo? 
\·lore  those the lv.rong  concepts  ancl  me'l.}JO({s  for achieving J~~ronomic  n.ncl 
Honetary Union?  \·/hat  co.u.sed. things to  go  astra;;'? 
5.  2  rrlle  firGt  r(;·g·~<?.n  haG  become  clear today is that He  "began monetary 
inte[,r:ration in :E.\1:cope  too  lute.  As  lon8  <W  the Bretton  ~·loocl.r::  r.;yntcm 
continued to function,  monetary unity \ms  certainly h1portc:mt  bnt  only  a 
long--term  aim  of  intC{~,r:rat:Lon efforts. 
First of all  \•le  l<antecl to harmonize· Jhe  inst:cumentn  a11d  objoctivc:s  of 
economic policy a:r1d  initial structural  condi  tiom;;  fiJ.'d  of aU the 
policies of the  Sto;tca  and of both shl8s of induutry \:ore  to be  harmor"b~ed. 
T'ne  creation of an inclepondent  :E.'urcpeun  monetary  s;ystern  ancl  a  common 
currency Hould then have  been the  cro·,ming accomplishment  :i.n  achieving 
:E.'u.ropean  economic unification. 
Novr  we  kr1ot·1  that  1·1c  have  lost  a  lot of time.  I  hope  not  il'ret:d.evabJ.yt 
Today the  pro1)lem:;  no~v pl'esent  themselves differoni,ly.  \le  noN  need 
Eoonomic  and I.':onotary  Union  i;o  call  t1  h<J.lt  to th('  cont::_Jlttnl  dcrrt:r·nction  of 
tho international  monetar~r syutcm  ancl  t.o  serve  •w  a  rr.ll;ying point;  for. 
forces pushing foJ.'  the  c:coation  of  a  ncu monetnr;y  order. 
5.3  The  second  r.~ll for  the unsatis:fnctory functi<ming of the l'iuropee.n 
monetu.ry  a:rrangementc  aB  they prosont:tJ-·  exist is that  there  lw:::  boc11 
insufficient  coordination  of economic  objectives  and  in::.;trur:lentrJ. 
So  long as there arc  differences in economic priori-ties  1  ~>o  long os  orw 
country rega:rdo  eGonomic  gro~Jth as of pe:rcunotin-t  impol'tn.uce  and.  n.no·~twr  :3oer3 dicioqul li  bi'E~. 'in ·!iho  bahirroe. of pllJ'li,6ritq  \·:11 ich· 1·1:Lft  ma1~e 
adjttstm(;m:tii  noceosary.  If real  p)"ogT~ss  'tollaJ:·dr_t·}'1c~noMic: 
U:nioJLJ.s  i2Ph~·il.di.:i:ev~l  '-tiJ:~l'l.the  o'bj ectivos· o{.  ecolJq!HiGc  •.• ·. 
be  maclc  oompe}ib].o  ,;~th.6  j:ltr:;trful~I1'ts at the  di  r.;ponal ·of the  . 
.  b~:J;i~J1lol1tzed,  ~rld.finally -the objectives fixed lw 
common  accord rnust  be  implb~~ntcid aucl  the Hember  Stateu must  jointly 
accept responsibil:i:ty for jhem. 
To  achieve greater convergence of economic trends  and  of policy goals  and. 
instrmnents also ·necessitates harmonb.ation of th(3  different r·asic  social 
'and rceional  structures.  This means  that those  countrioc.>  having a  sound 
economic structuro must  a'i.d  the \'leaker partners and  regions,  in other 
Hords that a  Jl,'uropean  adjustment  meche>  .  .nism extending to agricultural  1 
social and regional policy muct be  created.  A  conditjon of providfi1g 
aid for others is  ~  ... owave:r  tho right of all to participate in fonnula:t:Lng 
and implementing policy. 
· 5.4  The  third  rec~c.;on  for the failurN,  in economic  and  mnnc·!;e.ry  :i.ntegratton 
is to be  found in the  lacl: of dccision···mald.ng  nt:rncture;s  at the  Cnmnnm:i.ty 
level.  Consulta·tive bodies  ancl  non-lri.nding procedure!:>  a.re  innufficie:nt 
to impose  joint ndion •..  ~.'he  harmoni?.<1tion  of the  central  objoct:i.';os  of 
short-term  economic  otab:i.lization and.  ernplo;yment  policy in the  lt•·~'li!ber 
countries ¥Jill not  be  accorr.plirohed  b;y  consultation. 
necessary to  tra.:nnfor national poHorn  ::;t8p  by step to  Gommt:.nity  orr:a11r:  and 
in this Hay  ·to  put the  o!J;joctives  of  econo:-uic1  monetar~r <ted.  fo:ce:i.[,:;n  policy 
'(~10  chalJ.  ...  ~ngcs of  the prc::ent 
energy crisis  GhOil  painfully ho1v  li  ttln the  Community is prceentl;1·  cn.pe.ble 
.of asserting its political and.  cconowic  ntrcn{Si;h. 
But it is precisely at this point  7  l·lhrn it comeG  to ron'J'J.ncing  no,t.ionnJ. 
sovereignty,  that all Governments  shrink back  ru1cl  refur~c to  adm:i.t  ·to 
thomsel  ves that they havo  alrc::Wy  lost  p<1rt  of ·thuir m.t:i.onu.J.  w:dcnomy  ar-> 
a  result of tho  h:i.gh  degree  of  econotd.  r.  :i.ntordependenco,  Ji:ven  ilithou.t  the 
· enel'[zy  crif~is at  the  end  of'  19'73 it v.onld.  have  bnc,n  im)oss:i.blo  to  overlook 
the fact that for more  thah a  year tlw  Council  of  Minh~tor:r; had been putting.·· 
off virtually all importnnt  decision::;. 
1.Phc  real rousoJt for  t.hiri  r:.i.tuat:Lm1 \·tider, anclthe cJ'edibility of tho integration aims  corrtimwJ.ly  smaller. 
lli£U1AYS ·'1'0  fiDH1E:VJ~)iOJ'fgl'AlW.  }ll!L9.l.~_ 
6.1  It must  be  emph~:-..sizod here  once  u,go.in  that  HO  carmot aba.JHlon  the  t?:oal 
-of Economic  and .M.oneta.ry Union,  even  :i.f'  1;1e  must  find lle\1' methodS  to  achieve 
this.  A:. cqmmon.  market  r<3quires  a.  comwm  and stable 1w.sis  for ca.J.culaHng  .  . 
- - =- -- - -- - - - -
tho  costs of trade, and  pl<:U1!ling  product:Lon  ai1d  investment.  \"ii tltout  t}Ji s, 
there is a  continual danger of a  retrocrade development  and.  dir.integration. 
•J_lhe  Co;n:non  I'.1arket  is onl;y  viable in the  long run if it proceGclr::  to develop 
fu:ether into an  economic  a.Yld .monetary llnion.  Otherviise  ti18TC!  is a  danf;e:r 
that it \·lotilrl  regress into  a  free  traclr;  area.  'J'he  diSPHmtling of the 
Common  I'larket  could 1.:eB  take place faster than one  might  ~.n::;~:.tne toc1<-W  and 
under these  circtuastances  1vo  would no  longer need to concern  ouTrJe lvor;  1;i th 
Europca.n  intet:,Tat ion. 
He  are therefore faced H:i.th  the  ques:(;ion  of hou  i·io  nov:  intend to  achieve 
this final objective of Economic  and J.Ionetary Union. 
6.2  'l~'le  l!.U.ropean  Corhmunity  plays  a  decisive  rol(~ in the  i:c•rld  cco·rjOJay. 
It must  therefore  assmnc  .::.  corresponcJinr;  respons:i  bili·~;y  for  tho  ordorl;y 
functioning of the  ~·rorld 
1 r::  economy  1  a.  d.nty  ~·1hich Hill  he  nll  th(~  mc~_·o 
crucial if the  intern~tiona.l economic  8,f'r3tom  threc~tens to  diclin Lo(
0
'!'o,tc. 
i'Jo  have  bech able to put this off for  <'"  long timn  b<:3cuu:;o  "tlt:J  Jlrctton  \ioodrJ 
a,sTeomont  fum;tioncd toleralJly Holl 1  but  today  st:i ft ac:t  :i. on  l: ()\, nnls 
monetary  cool)Orahon  :i.s  imperative. 
monetary union.  'l'hat  m:w  notmd Utopi<m,  but in n:ality it ill  th<~ 




have  agreed on a  ncH  J·;orld  monet<::,r;)·  system. 
are in danger of gcunblin{\'  a.tvoy  the rosnlts of Eur·c,pean  fntograhon,  the 
unification of tho  mnrkc"tr;  of the I•!ombor  States. \·lith tho  ch:-.;npponrn.nco  of the l·lo:r·ld<:iclc  nfont:: !;ar;'{  oJ;dc:r' ·  ~~cin 
ComrtJun:i.'liy  need  a  m\:1 J~£:.y):!.2£...s.~r  il}_i:er;;i:i:·Y:.~.9l2"  Up  to  l10\.'  \/e  have  IJOrkocl 
towards  tho inter:ration of markets,  sectors m.:cl  regiolJ8.  J'!cw  i·<e  need in 
ud.di tion to-thosn  ondoavcittrn  a  noH  ac;:enb  of intcr;:Fat:Lon  :Ln  the  form  of 
•  ·  monetary unification• 
.s.e_cQ,ndly:  monet£'_ry  intc·)0:ration ha.s  -·  contrary to appoa.r<l,nces  - "'·  goocl 
chance  of  ::mcces~:;-,  ii' it 'becomes:  less cowrnitted to fh1t1i!l£; .·.  ideal 
institutional and.  procedural solutioiJS  than prov:iousl;v':  l'lbxm  for r:conomic 
nncl  I1lonetary Union have  up  to  no1v- l)eon  largely conceived  or:  the  :theoJ:>oticul 
level,  1-.rith li  ttlo attention t.o  practical realities. 
Tnese  plans  lacked snff:i.cient  links uith the mm·ket,  1mnLc  ancl  eirl:re~n·eneurs 
vlhich  alJ.•eady opnrate  011  a  European scale exten(U.ng  acl'mJn  Jiut:i.omol hOJxlers. 
The  Pl'esent  d<:mgerous  situation requires that Central  B:::m:cs  and the  ma.jo!' 
commercial  banlm  must  coordinate their n.cti vi  tieG  on  a  T:-.n'o)Je<Vl  level more 
than hitherto.  Thcorot:i.cally conceived.  pl~1s and.  tiJ::ctntJles  mu.st  bo 
replaced by  a  pe1~;ni coorclinatim1 of behaviour ·- a  }i}nropean  monetary 
dialO{:,'U.O  - Hi th the aim  of achieving a  common  rnone·tarJr  polic;y  toHal'ds. the 
rest of the \·Torld  .• 
?lli.rdJ;X_:  structural ancl  regional policy - 1·1hich  have  2.lw;ady  boon  r.Jeni:ionc~d  --
must  also get  aHo,y  from  idealistic thnm·etical models.  iic  need  a  liberaJ.i7..ed 
Europeo..n  oarL:i.J..ed. .  ..r!.!.£!.'1:~£.l  to even out  cli.f'forcncos  in product:i  v:i.t,y  nnd  to correc-t 
structural problems.  ~'he  planned £!!~~2~~~~J.:2nal l:\JD-1  iit)ulcl.  lie  hopolezoly 
overburdened if it were  supposed to achieve  thir.~  by  itEr;:!J.:f.', 
the essential rca.sons  for  tho  epic strncgle of pol:i.tic:i.U.1l':  w:w  r·.lr;o  be  found 
in this misconceptiorJ  of the Fund's  -Gar:~ks. 
mobilize European  capiteJ.  marl~c'ts  -to  meet  thic  challmJCe;  i;o  end.  thG  cl;J.;y:> 
of lDurope  being merely  a  centre for the distribution of'  foreign  c8.pital. 
6.4  Above. all the membor  countries must  nm·r  face  together the pr·osuing 
danger of a  further cliDintee;ration of the in'torllc.tionnl  wmct<w;y  syotew.  In 
vieu of the unce:x·'taintioo  in the 1nonetnry situation nnd.  the  irnm:inent  G1HU1£~C:s 
in balance  of pa;yine:nts  conditions in the  indur-;:tr·ial  COi.mtric)s,  H  ;;oulcl  not 
if \ve'· had  to lfvo  · 
.. 
., 
,· ~  ~ 
f  arnll,tua3.1Y·toc>rcliuoJ;ed. poiic;r.,  lt 
--- "-.·- --·:-_- -- .. --- -_- - - . 
"ha):;pens- \vi;l;ll.ill  tho. frtJ!BO\·rorl-::  Of 
Iatlie mean-time,  clor;8  rnonatary 
botveon ·the  EEC  and  i;he  most  hlportant  :i.nclur::t:daJ.·  E;l.;at:e~r, 
is essen tial•  Thir:>  kind  of  c once:ded 
- ---·- -
becU.rected  towa1.·ds  coopo:r:ation 
- ~ ·-:_'-_  ---- -·:  -~  _.  ~  -- - ---- -~  - - --
'  ~  _--- -- - - _- ~  - ~ :- _- -.  -
countries,  cmUd .r11akc  an  imP..c:>}.:ta.nt  and stabilizing coH-t:ribuU.on to 
iliternaticnial  lllonetCl.ry·:~Yei.ations.  ·  And  that v:ould  be  :i.n  eve:ryon.e 1r:l 
.. interest. 
A  glan9e  at  event;:;  in  the  monettn:~r  field in 1973  GhovT  how  necessnry 
this is.  Since  May  1973  for  exrunpJ.e  the  value of the  dollar in  te~ns 
of  the  currend  ':;!S  of  the  European float Jw.s  fluctunl:ed  by  mo:r.e  than 
20%,  only to  :t·eturn  at present  to its level of Harch  of last:  ;rea:cv 
This instability was  neither in  the·  interentn of  the  USA  uor  of other. 
industrial States,  nor  of countries  produc:tnr,;  rn1·;  m:.d:cd.nL.;.  The· 
consequences of the  rise in oil px-1ces  and  continniJJg  .'Jpeculation  :i.n  ·· 
gold lead one  to  f.cax- that  this 111onetary  instability  w:i.ll  con·t:Lnu.e~ 
Jfor  this  l~eason,  :L t  ·is vi  tal  that  the oxchanr,e  rcd:er;  bet.uceu  important 
trading partners  13hon:tc.l  no  longer  be  subject to  a:rbi trnry ellnnge[~  D.n~l 
exa6~eratcd movemnntu.  This  ne~escitates a  more  comprehensive  system 
of rules  and  agreements  than bcforn. 
Cooperation  betweon  tl1e  EEC  and  the  USA,  as  well  aG  nny  other intnrestcd 
pa:r.ty,  in the  field of  monetary  n:ffairs  1  conJ d  E:rw·n: u  ~~  ntinimtHit  of 
inte:rnational  monetc.J.',Y  oruer  and  ,,,inimi::.o  the  riu!:  of  a  l·m:d.cJ. .. ·\I:Ldo 
recession as  a  :ccsul t  of the  curnu:tr.~.ti ve  effcc ts  o .C  "bq·~r~;:'.:l.'··m;;..vuc:i r;hhour" 
J?Olid.cs.  SuGh  a  contribution to  r.tability  \Wuld  nlnr.;  lllf!J::o  i'l;  eardcr 
for  the  countries  floating indi  Y:i.dually  -to  llHdnta:i.n  n  nenr  .. d.bln  cxc:ll.c.n)gc 
rate.  The  cxpcrioncen  of 1973 pointed to  "l:he  fv.ct  thu.i;  unc1iGd  .. pl:i.J1ed 
floating has  tended  ~o increase  cl.or:~estic  in:Uationary  tc.:ndcnc:i.es aitd 
to  promot~ speculation in raw  materials. 11
:But  the  mcmbei'  countr:i.eB  muD~ not  only  combat  ·l;he 
c:Of  the  Comm1,n:Lt-y;  they mu:;;t  alr;o  cc;nao  to l'ot,;.:J.:l.'d 
a.ci.ori~ of  the.I.as:t  p:i.llars  wh.ic;h  mur; t;  riot:  be  allo\Ted  to 
.c·oJ.:i~psf!··.if.bhey are  to~"corilinuo  to enjoy  a  minimuu  of Hloneto.x·y 
•  st~bili~y  .. 
0 
PY'ogl:·e~::;. towards. tho  realization of  EconOPJiG  o.nd  no notary 
c{hibn is;;:h()\:IQVei' 1  Hlso  a  positive  contribu. tion  to\·u{rdn  ·the 
>of orderly niOHgtary  e.nd  comnrerc:i.aJ.  relations  ~.n  the HCJJ.'ld. 
A  Community  \·lhich is  eco~omic~l1.y .so  very dbpendont  r.Hl  the  rest of the 
world must  necessarily have  a  fundamental  intere:;;t  j,n  a.  stable  \'lorlcl 
economic  system. 
SetbackG  with domestic  economies  too  or even  a  standstill  on  tho  road 
tovrards  monetnry  integration in  the  Conununity  \·(ould. b.d.ng  cl.a11gers  nnd 
risks  for all member  eountrics.  'f.here  is uo  altern<.1.t:i.ve  to  the  economic: 
and  monetary  unif:Lco.t:i.on  of'  Europe.  Disintoe;rat:i.on  ancl  tho  rob:ent  :i. n t:o 
national solutions would  have  economic,  soei<:\1  nn.d  po1:i.U.C<ll  co::;l;r:;  Hhich 
no-Member  State could  afford to  pay.  There is therefore  only  the road 
forwards  towards  an  economic  and  monetary unj.ty  in Europe. 
The  Governments  of  thr~  morribor  countries  do  not  hn.YC!  mnch  more  time  in 
which  to  meet  this challenge.  ~~he  pol~.  tic[O:l.  and  economic  forces  :i.n.  the 
HorJ.d are in ·bhe  process  of  changing,  and };nrope  \d.J.J.  no  J.ongo:c  be  able 
to play a  role ii' the  European Sta  tcs  cont:i. nuo  t.o  tr:r  IJ.JJ.d  sol  vc  todn~'{  '~: 
problems  \V'itn  yesi;erclo.y' s  ideas  fWd  instrtunonts.  'l.'tre  oppo.l.'tllni'l:y  r~nd  tlu~ 
need  for  a  no\~  bcginn:i.JJg  are prer;ent  in tlw  chal.lcmr.:~P.  of  c:r.cat:i.ug  n. 
European  Honetary  Un:i.on using  n0H  nnd  unconventional  rno:)thoCJ.s"  \'/he-t:he!' 
1:10  make  usc  of  the  oppol'tunity derr;!nds  not lcaat of o.J.l  ou  .il:?.~~~ -:PRESSE7MEODELEtSE  '·  . 
MrTTEILUN[ANCOIEPRESSE. 
PRESS.-RELtAS(. ·.  . 
··  INFORMATION  A  LA :PRESSE  : , 
.  ..  'NFORMA{IONE AL~  eS!AMPA .. 
MEDEDEUNG  AAN  DE  PEeRS 
Drusscl s,  12  March  1971.]  ~  ~~(~~i~~.,~:~t:\t 
~~~:w.THE ONLY  ~vAY 'rO  EUROPE  rs· FORHARD 
- ~ -
· SutnmarJ;, of a  lecture by  Vicc-Pres~dcmt lrJilhGlm ·HAFERK.li.MP 
··at  the Gerrnan ·narucinr;  Confe·renc~  ..  :.hl~  ...  )~onn  ~~ 12  Mc':trch  197  4 
11The outlook  f:Or  monetary integration i:h  the EUropean' Commurli ty"  was ·the  subject 
of a lecture by  Mr~  vhlhelm. Haforkamp,· Vice-President of tho European  Commission, 
at the  German Janking Conference  in  ~Jonn orr  12IVIc1.:r:ch  1974  • 
.i\1r.  &~ferkamp described the  stn[';o  reached in econmnl.c  and  moiwtary union and  _ 
indicated important  reasons' for the sta.ndstill  and the' sot...o.backs  in the progress 
tovJards Europoml integration.  He  said that the  Community had  come to a  cross-
roads,  but that this should not cive rise to  any doubt  as to  the need for 
economic  and  r~onctary urrl  .. on~  which  ~ms more  inportant today than  ever before. 
How.ovort  m.3-ybe  different :ocithods  and  te.ohniquos  should be  found  in orcler to 
achieve it. 
'rho· second staee of economic  and  monetary union  tvas' already. due  to start in 
1974.  · In(3tead,  the planned monetary union  ~vas'  in danger of' clisinter,:rating into 
its nationul  components.  Only five;  instead of nine,  'Mnmbor  States were  still 
·· takint>rart in the  joint float'.·  The  oil crisis was  servine as another test· of 
the Community's  strength.  The  Community  hcd not  won  the battle yet.·  On  the 
contrary,· the  Member  States preferred an '116-very  man·  forhiofielf"  polity to'a 
cormnon  approach.  · ·  ·· 
-J. ;-. 
· Hhat  a.re  tho  reasons for this unforhmate  development  in the  proc;ress  towards 
cconomi.c·· and  monetary union?  l:ir.  Hafcrktt.mp  saw  three: 
l.  J~uropc bc{3'al'l  monetary intogrctti<m too late.  The creation of the· Common 
2. 
· Marlr.ct  \vas·. based on  a  v10rkable  int&rnntional  monetarY· systemi  ·Today, 
however,  monetary integration was  nccossary if the.prorsrcssive  collapse 
of tho  international  moh.etary  systern  lirn.s  to 1Je  halted. 
'rhe  economic  policy nims  of the 
too  much.  Integration required 
instru.mcnts of economic  policy. 
structur,ql  differences had  to  he 
inc1i vidual  Hombor  States still differed 
the  co-ordination of th(;  aims  and 
Even more,  the  serious regional  and 
overcome  by  joint eff0rts. 
3.  The  co-ordinQtin,o: boclics  have  so  far boon too  loosely knit  to be  able to 
achieve  any  real  co-ordinn:tion with  reF-:ard.  to  economj.c,  stability or 
employment  policies.  The  Govcrnracnts  had  so  far  shrunk back  from  trans-
ferring their national  sovcroi&;n  rir~hts to  the  Community.  The  stage of 
doclnrat:i.ons  of intent hnd  no  f<1r  not  been put  behindus. 
./. .- --- -.--~-
- - - - 0:- -. .  -:--,~ 
~-·.C  ,::_~~,)~-,>~-~<o_~,."  :- •  _o-_"_--- ,  __  ,_  --
··~~ li~f*0£~~~~~~i!~£~·~~{}~~~rX~PI~if~;~~~g~;~i~~~~fz~o~llo~~t  ~;~S~~d~~"~J~t·. 
~~~u~:,_v, ,d,.~~t-~~ahl:~1:bi\si!:5thoro-w:•rs<nlwirys•··-tliO····dal'l{icr  .. o:f'·1-6£~rc:ssion·····of.disint·o~ration.· 
.  <~:  ,··~;'£h<J.}Jornfuoitcfvbrket  could bo  dism~ntlo<lrnoro quickly·'than)nany people. imag:J.ne·· 
ff~c.,~·._.·-:. ;;n.tho.p.r~acnt  ·<lt.sarr~Y:· in  ••. thoi•In~:etary·····sLtuatio~···.the···Ellropean··Oo)mnunit;.··also· 
.. .•  had t\  rl)fjpClhf?i bility  vis~\-vis th~ vlholo  viorlclo  If it  .actod quickly vlith a 
. ...  ..  .  . _view  t:o.aohicvilig~monotary co-op¢ration it.could assumd  a  positive rce;u:lative 
f,:£·~y:. .. ·  . function;nt  a  tirnc  Whori  thq  international  economic  system isin dr1.J'leor/ 
- - ~  - -
Monotary  iptogf'ltion must  ,become  thq.now .in?enti  vo for coElplete iritE)e;ration  • 
.  ·~·-''  ·------~  ..  ;--._----·-~--· 
- - - - ~- - -- -
Host .of'_thoplarfsfcJ.' economic  and monetary. W1ion  are. still .on.'.the  drawing 
board;.  ·;.:~·T}1ay-,: coinpJ:a·fcly~ ·hick  imy firucs ·wit It  "tt1arke-t s 7  :banks-·tin·a·  firms.  .  .. 
ll.  pormeu1ont··:din.lor.>;Ue  at European· level and a· concorted ·attitude by  tho 
contrn.l  banks and  the  cowmercial  banks ·of  the Hembcr  countries must  servo 
to  OlJSU,r,e  '(;he  applicatton ,Of  a  QOffil!lOn  policy tovmfds  the  al!_lbient  rno11pta.ry 
.  \vor,lcl~  ,,-_._ 
·A 1iboru1iscd cnf)i tal  market is necessary in orcler that the differences 
in structure and  prod~ctivity in tho.  Cor:~ouni  ty can be  ironed out.  Tho 
J?~~nhccl Hcgional  F\mcl  ,;JOuld  be  overburdened. if it had to  cope  vJi th this 
'task on its own~· 
The  present .rncmctary  si  i;ua:l;i~n was  shaky.  The  ~iiember States rimst  therefore 
work  togCtl1er topbviatc/ t}:lo  darit,crs of. a  collapse of tho  intorn2.tional  monetary 
. systcra.'  rrhG  rise in- tho  pl'iCC  of oil and  speculation on currencies  Wore  {_';lVJ.ng· 
rise to the  fear that such claneors  '!Till  continue or become  oven  more  serious. 
In viq·i._of tho  im~;;inqnt  ~lctcrior::-~tion in the  1 )r'..L~J1oes::>f  n<:,y::nntn  of  r.omc 
· · inclustri<;Lliscd countrio.s, f~oo..tinc currencies v1cro  at  the worst  tb,nc;cr1 
1mt 
they,;1-1us_t  1)cr 1)rmieht  under control  throueh  the:  implementation. of a  co-ordinato<;l 
policy  ••.  1),  IJ)OnQ:t:ary  ail:i,p.nco  .. hpt\:Jccn  tho CoriJmunity  and  '\;hE:  lcndinr; industrial 
countries;  p<;Lrticularly. Fi  th the  US!\~  tvhioh  is 2-imod. at  co~opor2.tion with the 
oil prochicing countrics 1  viOuld  ho  dosir:tblc in this conneqtion.  This  could.• 
ensure  11  rJininum  aDount  of intcrn2.tionnl  orcler and· oontri  buto  tm-.rards 
stabilisation for  thor~c:  ourrcncios  t:~hich  arc floatine on their own. 
Nr.  Haforkarnp  did not  o~vi  sopo  n  collap~o  ·of- the  Community  in. tho ncar futuro. 
Ho~'10ver 1  tho  Hombor  Stntcs  must  learn to  consider tho  Community  as  a  pillar . 
which  shou.lcl ensure ·11  r:linimJ.m  nmount  of stability both internally nl:1cl  vis-3.-vis 
tho  outside  vmrld.  Howcvc;r,  "-.  r;t<indstill .in the  pro,~ross towards  integration 
·.  contain,ed the:  clangqr of cU,sintGgration <me)_  a  return to  the. idea of separate 
nh.tional  o..pproa.chcs  which no  Member  Sto.to _vmnts 1  let done could put into 
effect  o  Consoquc:fltly  1  tho  only ww  vm.s  fo:h"arcl  towards .2.  Europcun  economic 
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,Resume  du  d~scours prononce  par  H.  \vilhelm  H::Lferknmp,  Vice-Presiclent  de 
ln'  C6mmi'ss'ion(·~evant  la Deutscher B.mkentag a Bol}n,  le  l2  rtijrs  ~914  .. 
;  -··~·~- - •O  :  -t_  :  .. :._  -' 
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1l.ps  per~pective.s  de  1 1 intcgr.0..t:j.on  monetn.ire  clans  lo.  C·:>mmu!faute  europe~nne" ont 
oonstitue le  theme  du  disc7u.rs  que  r:r.  \rJilhelm  Haferkamp,  Vice-Prosiclc;nt .de .la 
Commissifm  des  Commun::tutos  europeennes,  a  prononc6  ltj  12  m;;.rs  1974  a Bonn  devnnt 
le  Deutscl).er  Bo..nkent::t.g.  , 
_,__  •  - - '  k- •  - • 
. M.  H'.1ferk{tmp  !1  CXJU':JS6  la sitU·l.tton  de .:l,'Union  ecoriomique  c:t  monetaire et  enumer6 
lus  principalesraisons  cle  1 1u.rret  et  cle  laregression d<r.l'integr;ttioneuropeenne, 
L.•  Communnute  so  trouve a  ln.  croisee  des  chemins.  '.floutefcis,  ln nccessite cl'une 
: ~niun  6conom~que et  mon0t,Aj.r.~  nq  sievr.qt1;_,p0.S  etre mise  en cloute.  Ello -~st  3.U;... 
_.;• ,,jour:d' hui  pl1,1s  .import~nte  q1J.e,  j::tmais,_· m1.is! i1 .f.~.udrn.i  t · p~:mt-etre. trouver  d 1nutres 
: rnothodes  ~t cl.'.i:l.utrus  techr)cigue::;  pour  lu.  :re.J.liser. 
rC  -- _  ••  ,  ••  o  •  '•  •  '•A'., 
0 
0  ·:  ••  ·''  ''  •  ·:  0  ,•  •  >,  .,  ·.  .  .  •  >  • 
f  :'.  •:L'n:nn6c  19.74  clevr;;Lit  marqqc:r::.·}E:,;p'l..ssn.ge a ln. cleuxif;,mq_;:etu.pe  clo  l 1:union;ecbnomique 
·  1:ei;  mon6i;aire'!.  ;\u  lieu  d~:·ct::l<t,  l'unJqn monct.'l.ire:projdoe  ris,que  ~l~  s~ ·dislqquer 
,p()1..lr  fai:rc  pbqe  ·"lUX  divor9 ce:J,ements  nnt.:i,on~mx qlii  l1.  composont e:  . Les  Etn:'!;s .. mem-
~  -- - - - -_- - - .  - . -- ..  "  - .  . - t-· _.- -~- .  .  - :  - •  - . - _- .  ...  .  -~--- ·;  -
,·: .. ' ··9:r:es.,~~' par:l!~~ip<mt  ..  autflo-j;~~m~nt.  :.  cornmun:~e  son:~  pl~s em:  ?inq, ~u  .. l;i;e':  de  .. !l~uf  •. 
L:trcr.;~,~e  clu  pctr.olo  s::>umd  uno .nouvelle .fo:ts  l'vCommun...,.uto .a une rude, epreuye· qUl. _ 
n 1 ~St .i)11f:J·_'~llCf~fO  sur,m()nt ee  o  · .:1u., contrn.ire  t .~ies  b"tat~  rTIG(Qbros .·  pre~~J?en_( +a! p;·ii  ti-
qtl.<il  du 
11Ch·'1CUn;]:>0Ur  S(li11  a  l 10:ction  Cr:.>mmune~:  :·  - .,  ,  _.  I. 
.  ·.r 
QueUes  sont  lf;s  crmses  de  cette  d6vi·~tion d"'ms  1·".1.  m!J,rche  vers  1 1union  economique 
ot  monotr:l.ire  ? _l,J.,  Hu.fur~:-:tmp en vrji  t  tro~s.  ..  •.. 
;;  i  :  ::.·  ;··-i  .  - ( 
1'1u:t'ope_:p.~en~am(jv~if?Pt!lr<:ll~~  proc<:lssus  d
1 integr't~ion.,J!1o~~tn.~ro. ·.  L:L  cr6~tirm 
UU  march~·  G0Tr)!JI1ltn  qt  'l~  t;  b'Ls.oe  ~tl~  un 
1 ~;ysterne  ~ony:~~ir~  ~~t~rnn.t  iO~!ll,  ~n (ltD.~.  , 
de  fc,nctHmner  normv,lement..  111rns 1 ;l.UJOUrd 1 hu~,  l •  .. J.nt ograt1on  monvtauor~st.  nc-
cesr?·.,,ii'e  pO\lf  strJpper.h <lil:jlOcntivn  prrJg:J:'essiyo.  c1e  l'ordro lllCinGtn,ire  n1ondirtlo 
Les • Gbjectifs 'aconomiques  des  .&,'tr>,ts rmuwbres  sr.  .. nt restes trop differoniis·.:·', 
L1int6grn.tion impliquc  l;t  cc>0rclin·'.tic>n  des  objectifs  l:.!t  cl<.:is  instruments cle  la 
politique  economique.  Bien  plus  1  loB  f,:,rtes  Llis  p1.ri  t 8s  r0gionJtles  et structu-
ro11os  d.r;ivent  Ot:co  supprim6us  pn.r  uno  n.cti(m  commm1e. 
Los: organea  clO  crJorclin-'ltion  n 1 rmt  p'1.S  8U  jUSqU I ici lr:t  cr1hus i",n  SUffiS'tnte  v:mr 
parvenir  Et  uno  CcJllCL!rtatirJn  rclollo  d.us  pr,litiquus  clrm8  l•JS  (bmn.int~S  de  lu.  o·m·-
jc  .. ncture,  do  ln.  sto.bilit6 et  de  1 1crnplr•i.  Les  gnuvurnumunts  n 1ont  t'lUj!Ju.rs 
pas  pu  se  reS<;U('\.rG  CLU  tr.,,nsfert  do  curtains elun\unts  QO  ln,  snuvern.inc:te natio-
. nale  a ]_I echelon  cr;rnmun.·out.'l.lt'O •  0n  On  USt  rest  0  a clOB  (~leGl'l.r:;,tions  d I inten-f.i':Ollw 
.  I ... 2
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1'1 1~~~t}l;i.fJ;1<6m£~~~~0\_i~lrstie~<{Uei·.le{poufs-uito-~ct@}i-intcgrati)n  __ ;6cvn(;rnirltio  Gt  rn-·,ndt::tirec 
-csmstituo 1D-'SGt11G.QU<lnoe  dG~SUrV'ie  dU  marchecommun., _  .1\  dofn.ut  cl 1une  b'J.SO  s·:;1ido, 
~b"'clr;mge:t\d-'urierog]."qssign·ou tl'une  cl6sr:tgret;'J.Jion(lemoure.  Lft  clustl'uction  clu  mar-
-- .•  6116- oomnltin  J>()U~rqit  SG  fn._ir<:)plus  rapicloment -que  bUCl.UOOUp  ni;;l  1 1 imngincmt  n.ujourcl' hui. 
~ ;< (,t  £~~: i&'  \ilt\l~tiO{  ;gt'!Oll~ de  (!OsaJ'ro i  mon Ct  air~ 
1  1?.  c  ommumu t 6 euro  pOe nne  a  Oga-
J.emont .-unSJ  rospons-':l.bi1it6 moncliale.  Elle  peut,  si e llu  ngit  r:>..piclement  d:ms  lo 
--: 
. sens·d.'1.u1.o  cl';op6ration rn6notairo,  jc,uer un r0le  ordonnatuur  posi'tif a un  moment 
ol),  1'  economic  monclinle  est menacee. 
U.  Hafe:rk2mp1  la Commun1.ut e  d0i  t  prendre  O')nsoienoo  do  tr()is  ft'.i ts osson-
L'intogration. mon6tnire:  ... dnit  ..  dovenir.. i8  n::Juv:~/1u  .. mot.eu.r  de  1 1 intet:;rat i•.;n. 
2} Les. plrtns  cl'uniol1  eobno~rni.que et mcmetriire  en. scmt. souvent restes a 1 1 6tat 
tl'ebauohe, faute  {l'Gtre enprise clirecte sur  ius ·nnrohes,  los banquus  et  los 
entre  prises.  Un  clialoeu,e  europee.n. :PO.rllkt,nent  et unu  r:t tt  i tucle  concertc:e  des 
b::mquus  centrn.1us  ut  des  bn.nques  cl' affaires  dus  pl.ys  membrus  dc:lit  purrn•Jttre 
13.  mise  en  auuvre .d'une  politique. _commune  vis-a-vis .d~s  <lUtres  milie-ux mc·n6..:. 
to.ires. 
3)  Il fn.ut  que  le ml.roh6  uuropeen  clos  oapi  t:tux  so it 1ib6;ro.lise  dav-:mt'lge  pour 
rocluire  lus differunces  de  structures et  de  productivit6  clans  l::t  Commun.LUt6. 
10  Fonds  r6givna1,  tel qu' il est  cont;u ser·'i  t. suroh:tre6  s 1 i1  clev.;;.it.  ex6cut.~r 
seul cotte  missi~n. 
' 
L1.  situat:i,on monetD.ire  actuc llu e·st  incertn.ine.  Les· Etn.ts  m~mbres· doivent,  clone 
.c1utttfr  en c ommun  oor.1tre  le  c.hnger  d 1un: eff.;:.ndrement ·de .1' orclro mon6tnirp  r.inturnn-
tiono.1.,  L:th:tusse  des  prix clu,·p6tro1e  e·t  ln.  spcoul.J.tion sur  l 1')r:  l1,issent  reclou-
tor que  ce cln.neer  uxiste toujours et  mGme  qu 1i1 s'aggrave.  Compte  tenu  de  la cl8._ 
· t·\:iric•rat ion  _que  \ront  · subir.  10s ·balances  des  paiements  de  certains  pl.ys  industrit: ls 
1 
· :le  flottument  des  inonn.'J.iGf3  ·n  1 est  prw  1a piro solp.ticm,  m-"..i::r  il cloi:t;  ,'Jtre  ccmtro16 
.;par uno  P':Jlitiqu.e concurtee.  ~~  oE;:t  ~go..rcl,  iJ ser:.it  s'Jukdtab1o  que  s 1instaure 
r;:ntre  1a Communn.ute  et. h:s  princip[>.UX  vws  industrilOls,  ·.::n  premi~r liuu les  Et.'J.ts-
Unis,  une  entont~ rnon:6t::tj_re  qui  s·oit: en  outre  .1.xce  sur  l-1.  cCJopur.:'l.ti::m  :wee  1us. · 
:p6.ys  procluoteurs- de ·p&trvle.-,  Celle-c?- purmettrn.it  cle  ·ea.r=>.ntir  un  minimum  cl'r)rclre 
·a  1
16chelon  intvrnn.ti•)nq1,;t  aurait, n.insi un-rcllestabit;is.'J.te:ur,  mGme  vmr  les 
pnys  clrmt  l,'J.  monnaie  fl•;tte  iso16ment. 
III.  Haferkamp  \~st ime  quu  1 1 on  nu  se t r,ouve  p1.s  a ln.  voi1lu  cl\;!  1 'ef.funclrvmlJnt  d8  b. 
Communcut6.  Les  Etats  membres  doiv'"nt  oepenchnt  n..pprenclre a c·mcevoir  1a Commu-
n'l.ute  comme.  un  pilier qui [pr-;.nti't  le m::tintien  cl'un  minimum  de  stabili  tt: w  1 1 in-
torieur  oommo  a l'uxterhi\lr.  _ Toutufois,  1 1interruptirm de  1 1int6gro.tL;n f1.it 
peser  1i1  mt.:m:>..oe  d 1u:r1e  cl6sin't6crati''m etcl'une renn.ti·:malis!J.ti:_.n  qu'aucun  E't.:tt 
inombre  ne  vEJut  ut  [;~.  plus  f0rte r1.ison  ne  pourrcit supporter.  11  ne  reste  c_hnc 
plus  qu
1a.  cl1er  clu  1 1nv·,nt  pot-r  r6alisur  l 1union (.Joon,·;miquu  de  l 1Eurc;pu. 
.  --